reading as authoring

It is sel­dom use­ful when peo­ple speak in com­plete gen­er­al­i­ties. Propo­si­tions with­out con­crete sub­jects cause one’s brain to infer mean­ing wher­ever one (or one’s brain) sees fit. This can cause a reader to attribute to the author thoughts and feel­ings that in fact gen­er­ated from the reader, which in turn causes the reader to grossly mis­un­der­stand the author’s intent.

I am a firm believer in intent. Authors rarely write with­out an intended mes­sage. Cer­tainly, there have been works writ­ten to inspire rather than inform (Lewis Carroll’s Jab­ber­wocky comes to mind.) But in the case of phi­los­o­phy, and espe­cially con­tem­po­rary aca­d­e­mic phi­los­o­phy, being vague in this way seems to go against the point.

When you do phi­los­o­phy, and espe­cially when you are writ­ing it down, you are con­cerned with estab­lish­ing that your thoughts are true. This is con­sid­er­ably more dif­fi­cult when you attempt to write clearly, because your thoughts must be orga­nized and be sup­ported by evi­dence, exam­ples, etc. When you write vaguely, you can say any­thing, and what­ever the per­son is think­ing of when they are read­ing becomes what you wrote about. When you write vaguely, you do not own your thoughts. They become the prop­erty of the reader. You can not legit­i­mately claim to have writ­ten these ideas.

So if some­one comes away from your work and has a dif­fer­ent idea than what you intended, can you say that they have under­stood you? Have you com­mu­ni­cated your ideas? In both cases, the answer is no.

In phi­los­o­phy, if you write vaguely, you aren’t writ­ing at all.

This is why I tend to dis­like the con­ti­nen­tals. Hegel, Hei­deg­ger, etc. I stick with good ol’ bor­ing ana­lytic phils­o­phy — Rus­sell, Wittgen­stein, Ayer, etc. I deeply dis­trust any­one who says they are inter­ested in con­ti­nen­tal phi­los­o­phy, because it’s really just a bunch of essays. That’s fine, for lit­er­a­ture. Phi­los­o­phy, and philoso­phers how­ever, need to be more serious.

Leave a Reply

«

»